Chavez v. Martinez: Do You Really Have a Right to Silence? by Khomani, Kimberly Cain
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 54 
Issue 1 Fall 2004 Article 8 
2004 
Chavez v. Martinez: Do You Really Have a Right to Silence? 
Kimberly Cain Khomani 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Kimberly C. Khomani, Chavez v. Martinez: Do You Really Have a Right to Silence?, 54 Cath. U. L. Rev. 373 
(2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol54/iss1/8 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
CHAVEZ V. MARTINEZ: DO YOU REALLY HAVE A
RIGHT TO SILENCE?
Kimberly Cain Khomani
"You have a right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be
used against you in a court of law."' Warnings of this type are now well-
known,' but their impact on a suspect's rights remains unclear. Such
Miranda warnings are meant to ensure that police do not coerce
unwitting suspects into making incriminating statements.' If the police
do not give Miranda warnings, the suspect's statements cannot be
admitted into evidence against him at trial,4 subject to various
exceptions Arguably, these Miranda warnings give the police an
incentive to follow the rules and not coerce a suspect into foregoing his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. However, is this
safeguard effective in those instances where a suspect's un-Mirandized
statements are not introduced at trial? Does Miranda protect a suspect
from police coercion under these circumstances?
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in the 2003 case
6Chavez v. Martinez. That case arose out of a § 1983 civil rights action,7
J.D. Candidate, May 2005. The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author wishes to thank 0. Carter Snead for his insight and guidance throughout
the writing process.
1. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 286 (1986). This phrase is only one part
of the Miranda warning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Under Miranda,
"prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
2. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974) ("At this point in our history
virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language, of the provision
that reads: 'No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... ").
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)
("[C]oerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency.").
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
5. E.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) (acknowledging a public
safety exception). Under the public safety exception, exigent circumstances that threaten
the public's safety, such as the need to question the suspect on the whereabouts of an
abandoned gun in Quarles, excuse an officer's failure to issue Miranda warnings prior to
questioning a suspect. Id. at 651, 653.
6. 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001). The statute provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
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where Oliverio Martinez alleged that police sergeant Ben Chavez
violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments when the officer interrogated him without Miranda
warnings and ignored his pleas to end the interrogation.8 Initially,
officers Maria Pena and Andrew Salinas stopped Martinez during the
course of a narcotics investigation.9 During a pat-down frisk, a struggle
ensued between Officer Salinas and Martinez.' ° Officer Pena shot
Martinez several times, in the face, vertebrae, and leg." The incident left
Martinez blind and paralyzed in both legs.' 2
Sergeant Ben Chavez, the patrol supervisor, accompanied Martinez to
the emergency room to hear his version of the events." Without reading
Martinez his rights under Miranda, Officer Chavez questioned Martinez
about the shooting. 4  During the forty-five minute interrogation, in
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
8. Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub nom.
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
9. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854. The officers were questioning a farm field worker,
Eluterio Flores, but found no drugs on his person nor any other evidence of criminal
activity. Brief for the Respondent at 1, Chavez (No. 01-1444).
10. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854. Officer Salinas felt a knife, which Martinez used in his
work as a strawberry field worker. Id.; Respondent's Brief at 2, Chavez (No. 01-1444).
11. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854. The facts of the incident are disputed. Id. The officers
claimed that Martinez grabbed Salinas's gun and aimed it at them. Id. Martinez, however,
claims that he did not touch the gun. Respondent's Brief at 3, Chavez (No. 01-1444).
12. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854. Martinez, formerly a strawberry field worker, still
suffers as a result of that fateful day. See Steven Chawkins, It's 'Just Wrong, Says the
Plaintiff,' L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at A14. According to one news article, he is "[iln
pain much of the time, [but] sometimes can get around by using a walker. One of his eyes
is missing and, beneath his sunglasses, he wears a bandage over the socket." Id. The
article paints a portrait of Chavez's life:
He lives a world away from the marble chambers of the U.S. Supreme Court. He
doesn't have a phone, or even a bathroom. With his father, Oliverio Sr., he
resides in a dark, cramped trailer about the size of a suburban walk-in closet, a
dilapidated tin box outside Camarillo beside the strawberry fields he had worked
for the better part of 20 years.
Id.
13. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854.
14. Id. at 854-55. For a full transcript of the interrogation, see Benjamin Chavez, I
Fought the Law, HARPER'S MAO., Sept. 2003, at 20. To hear an excerpt of the transcripts,
as well as discussion of the case by R. Samuel Paz, lawyer for Oliverio Martinez, Sonia
Mercado, co-counsel for Martinez, and Alan Wisotsky, lawyer for Sergeant Ben Chavez,
see Exclusive: Democracy Now! Broadcasts for the First Time a Recording of a Police
Sergeant Interrogating a Man Moments After Police Shoot Him 5 Times, Paralyzing and
Blinding Him, DEMOCRACY Now, May 30, 2003, at www.democracynow.org/
article.pl ?sid=0305/30/1610234.
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between periods of lost consciousness, Martinez expressed to Chavez
that he was in extreme pain and thought he was dying; he twice told
Chavez that he did not want to continue the conversation.15 Martinez's
responses to Chavez's interrogation were never used against him in a
criminal proceeding, but Martinez, nevertheless, brought a civil rights
action in federal court. 6
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ruled in
favor of Martinez, granting him summary judgment." Chavez appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the
lower court's ruling, 8 and held that Chavez violated Martinez's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by coercively interrogating him against
his will.' 9 The court reached this conclusion even though the prosecutors
did not use Martinez's statements against him in a subsequent criminal
proceeding.
15. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854-55. The medical staff instructed Chavez to leave several
times, but he returned to continue his interrogation. Id. at 854.
16. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 764-65 (2003). Martinez's action was brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jd.
17. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 855. The court also denied Chavez's qualified immunity
defense. Id. Qualified immunity protects public officials, like Chavez, "'from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Only conduct that
an official could not reasonably have believed was legal under settled law falls outside the
protective sanctuary of qualified immunity." Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). To determine whether qualified immunity applies, the court uses a two-
part analysis. Id. at 855-56. First, the plaintiff must allege a prima facie case that the
public official violated his constitutional rights. Id. Second, if such a case is stated, the
court must decide whether the alleged constitutional violation was improper under clearly
settled law. Id. at 856.
18. Id. at 859.
19. Id. at 856. The court concluded:
The record before us reveals that Sergeant Chavez doggedly pursued a statement
by Martinez despite being asked to leave the emergency room several times. He
ignored Martinez's pleas to withhold questioning until he had received medical
treatment. A reasonable officer, questioning a suspect who had been shot five
times by the police and then arrested, who had not received Miranda warnings,
and who was receiving medical treatment for excruciating, life-threatening
injuries that sporadically caused him to lose consciousness, would have known
that persistent interrogation of the suspect despite repeated requests to stop
violated the suspect's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
coercive interrogation.
Id. at 858.
20. Id. at 856-57. In holding that Officer Chavez violated Martinez's Fifth
Amendment rights, even though his statements were not used against him in a criminal
proceeding, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon its opinion in Cooper v. Dupnik, 963
F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992). In Cooper, the court held that a Fifth Amendment violation
occurred at the time of the coercive interrogation, regardless of whether the interrogated
suspect was ever called upon to incriminate himself. Id. at 1239.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's
decision regarding the scope of the Fifth Amendment's protection
against self-incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
of due process under the given factual circumstances.2' The Court, in a
plurality opinion, held that even though Chavez did not recite Miranda
warnings, the interrogation did not violate Martinez's constitutional right
against self-incrimination because his statements were never used against
him and thus could not be the basis of a § 1983 civil rights action
grounded in the Fifth Amendment. 2 In addition to reversing the Ninth
Circuit's ruling on the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issue, the
Court also remanded to the Ninth Circuit the issue of whether Martinez
could pursue a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim
against Officer Chavez.23
This Note examines suspects' Fifth Amendment protection against
self-incrimination by exploring the development of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence prior to Miranda. Next, this Note discusses the rationale
of Miranda, as well as its status as a constitutional requirement out of
reach of normal congressional legislation. Then, this Note looks at the
Chavez decision, analyzing: 1) whether a Miranda violation can trigger a
§ 1983 civil rights action without the use of an un-Mirandized statement
at trial, and 2) whether Martinez could have a cognizable claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process clause. Exploring in
detail the diverse opinions of the Court in Chavez, this Note argues that
the absence of a unified opinion on the Fifth Amendment issue indicates
that, although it is not willing to expand Fifth Amendment protection to
encompass the Chavez scenario, the Court is still struggling to find an
effective remedy against coercive police interrogation. The five to four
opinion on the substantive due process claim may provide such a remedy,
recognizing the tension between the need for the police to gather
information and the right of the suspect not to be a victim of excessively
coercive police interrogation.
I. SELF-INCRIMINATION AND COERCED CONFESSIONS: BEGINNINGS
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states "No person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...
,24 The Supreme Court first applied this amendment in Brain v. United
States25 to determine the appropriate use of incriminating confessions.26
21. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 765-66. (2003) (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 772-73 (plurality opinion).
23. Id. at 779-80 (Souter, J., concurring). Part II of Justice Souter's concurrence was
also the opinion of the Court. Id. at 777.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
25. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
[Vol. 54:373
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The Court stated, "In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States,
wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because
not voluntary, the issue is controlled by... the Fifth Amendment... ,,27
The privilege against self-incrimination existed only at the federal level
until 1964, when the Court decided Malloy v. Hogan.' In Malloy, the
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the states the
.... 29
Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. By
incorporating Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination
into the Fourteenth Amendment for use by the states, the Court sought
to prevent states from compelling an individual to speak against his will
because such comments may be used at trial."'
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS
Two years after Malloy put Fifth Amendment protection within
defendants' reach for their use against state compulsion of incriminating
testimony, the Miranda v. Arizona3' decision went even further. Miranda
ensured protection from compelled self-incrimination by placing an
affirmative duty on police officers to inform suspects of their rights prior
26. Id. at 542.
27. Id.
28. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The petitioner in Malloy, who previously pled guilty to
gambling, was called on to testify by the State of Connecticut to further its investigation
into alleged gambling activities. Id. at 3. The petitioner refused, stating that testifying
would result in self-incrimination. Id. The Superior Court of Hartford County held him in
contempt, imprisoning the petitioner until he was ready to cooperate with the
investigation. Id. Both that court and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors denied
petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, finding that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination applied only at the federal level and that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not extend this protection to the states. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review whether the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination extended to
the states. Id.
29. Id. at 6. The test the Court used to determine whether the police violated the
Fifth Amendment was
not whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession was
shocking, but whether the confession was "free and voluntary: that is, [it] must
not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.
Id. at 7 (quoting Brain, 168 U.S. at 542-43).
30. Id. at 8. The Court stated, "The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state
invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal
infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty... for such silence." Id.
31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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to any questioning.32 For the first time, police officers were required to
inform suspects of their right to remain silent.3
Miranda, a landmark case, arose out of four consolidated appeals to
the Supreme Court, the facts of which reinforced the Court's view that
the Fifth Amendment was ineffective without additional safeguards.34 In
the first case, Miranda v. Arizona, the police interrogated the petitioner
at a police station without first informing him of his rights.35 The
petitioner confessed in writing after a two-hour interrogation, attesting in
his statement that "the confession was made voluntarily . . . 'with full
knowledge of [his] legal rights, understanding [that] any statement [he]
make[s] may be used against [him].' 36 In the second case, Vignera v.
New York, the government used the petitioner's uninformed confession
against him at trial and claimed that a suspect had no constitutional right
32. Id. at 444.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 456-57. The Supreme Court reviewed these cases at a time when crime
rates were at a record high. ALFREDO GARCIA, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: A
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 88-89 (2002). Two years before the Miranda decision,
former President Dwight Eisenhower spoke of the crime issue during a speech he gave at
the Republican National Convention:
Let us not be guilty of maudlin sympathy for the criminal who, roaming the
street with switchblade knife and illegal firearms seeking a helpless prey,
suddenly becomes upon apprehension a poor, underprivileged person who
counts upon the compassion of our society and the laxness or weakness of too
many courts to forgive his offense.
Id. at 88 (quoting LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 40 (1983)).
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-92. Alfredo Garcia, in The Fifth Amendment: A
Comprehensive Approach, describes Ernesto Miranda:
Ernesto Miranda, a Mexican American, was the quintessential "poor" defendant
whose fate with the law was unfavorable from the outset of his life. He had an
eighth-grade education and had had six arrests and four imprisonments between
the ages of fourteen and eighteen. Miranda not only had an extensive criminal
record at age twenty-three, when he was arrested for the crimes that would bring
him fame and notoriety, but he also had a spotty employment record in which he
held menial jobs for short periods of time.
GARCIA, supra note 34, at 91. Contra Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18
U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 181-84 (1999)
(noting that "[l]awyers typically regard [Miranda] as the central dramatis personae in the
Supreme Court's most famous criminal law decision, rather than as a dangerous criminal
who robbed and raped a number of women," and providing a detailed look into the facts
of Miranda's crime and interrogation).
36. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-92. The confession was admitted in Miranda's jury trial.
Id. at 492. He was convicted of kidnapping and rape, and sentenced to twenty to thirty
years in prison. Id. The Court, in reversing the conviction, held that "[tIhe mere fact that
he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had 'full
knowledge' of his 'legal rights' does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver
required to relinquish constitutional rights." Id.
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to a warning regarding his protection against self-incrimination. 37
Similarly, in the last two cases, Westover v. United States and California v.
Stewart, the petitioners made confessions without full knowledge of their
38
rights under the Fifth Amendment.
The Court held that, in the context of a custodial investigation, a
confession will be deemed involuntary due to the inherently coercive
nature of the interrogation unless police officers use procedural
safeguards to ensure that a suspect does not unwittingly incriminate
himself. 9 Thus, an uninformed confession is inadmissible in a criminal
37. Id. at 491-92. Vignera confessed to robbery without being told of his rights. Id. at
493. At trial, defense counsel asked the police officer whether Vignera had been advised
of his rights. Id. The trial judge sustained the prosecution's objection to the question, thus
preventing defense counsel from proving that Vignera was not warned of his right to
remain silent. Id. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows: "The law doesn't say that
the confession is void or invalidated because the police officer didn't advise the defendant
as to his rights. Did you hear what I said? I am telling you what the law of the State of
New York is." Id. at 493-94. Vignera was convicted of first-degree robbery, and
sentenced to thirty to sixty years in jail. Id. at 494. The State argued to the court of
appeals that "Vignera had no constitutional right to be advised of his right to counsel, or
his privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
38. Id. at 495-98. Westover was interrogated first by the local police for several hours
without warnings of his rights, but he did not confess. Id. at 494-95. He was then handed
over to the FBI, who interrogated him for two hours, after which he confessed to two
robberies. Id. at 495. His confessions were used at trial. Id. Westover was convicted of
the robberies at a jury trial and was sentenced to fifteen years. Id. The Supreme Court
found that even though the FBI warned Westover of his rights, "the FBI interrogation was
conducted immediately following the state interrogation in the same police station[,] ...
the federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-
custody interrogation[, and] the giving of warnings alone was not sufficient to protect the
privilege." Id. at 496-97. In Stewart, the police interrogated Stewart nine times over the
course of five days. Id. at 497. During the final interrogation, Stewart admitted to robbing
the victim. Id. He was never advised of his rights. Id. Stewart was convicted of robbery
and first degree murder and was sentenced to death. Id. at 498.
39. Id. at 444. The Miranda Court cited two police manuals that contained
instructions on how to extract confessions from unwitting suspects. Id. at 448-55. An
excerpt from one such manual is as follows:
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the investigator's
office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject should be deprived of
every psychological advantage. In his own home he may be confident, indignant,
or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell
of his indiscretions of criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover
his family and other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In
his office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests
the invincibility of the forces of the law.
Id. at 449-50 (quoting CHARLES O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 99 (1956)). Although such calculated examples of police coercion are
compelling, it is important to note that the facts of Miranda itself did not indicate such
extreme coercion. See id. at 491-92. The case stated that after two hours of questioning,
Miranda signed a written confession. Id. There was no evidence of extreme coercion in
the facts of the case. See id.
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proceeding against a suspect. ° In the absence of other equally effective
procedural safeguards proposed by lawmakers, the Court required the
police to advise a suspect, prior to any questioning, of his right to remain
silent, that his statements could be used against him in a subsequent
criminal proceeding, and of his right to obtain an attorney on his own or
through court appointed means.4' The Court reasoned that the suspect
could only waive these rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
42
To support its decision, the Court referred extensively to two police
manuals that shed some light on the police tactics in use at the time.43
40. Id. at 444, 479.
41. Id. at 444. In order to further safeguard against false confessions, some states
have implemented mandatory videotaping of police interrogations. See generally, Steven
A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of
Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 337 (2001).
42. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Court in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986),
outlined the voluntary waiver standard, stating that
[t]he inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First, the relinquishment of the right
must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the
waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the
'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' rcvcals both an
uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
Id. at 421 (citations omitted); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981)
(articulating an interpretation that a waiver must not only be voluntary, but it also must
constitute a "knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege"); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (applying a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach to waivers by juveniles); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,
374-76 (1979) (explaining that an explicit waiver is not required); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (emphasizing that waiver requires relinquishment, not mere
comprehension of the right to counsel). But see GARCIA, supra note 34, at 119. Garcia
criticizes the "voluntary" waiver requirement, arguing that
the government [should be precluded] from offering a waiver by the suspect as a
means of persuading the trial court that a confession was voluntarily given....
[P]olice ought not to hide behind either the warnings or a waiver in order to
shield an otherwise involuntary confession from scrutiny. Because Miranda
serves primarily as a useful adjunct to law enforcement, the police should not be
able to hide behind its false beneficence.
Id.
43. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55. One dissenting opinion criticized the majority's
reliance on police manuals not used by the police officers in Miranda. Id. at 499 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). Justice Clark, in his dissent, took issue with the majority's characterization of
current police tactics and the references to the police manuals in its decision. Id. at 499
(Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark stated:
[I cannot] join in the Court's criticism of the present practices of police and
investigatory agencies as to custodial interrogation. The materials it refers to as
"police manuals" are, as I read them, merely writings in this field by professors
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The Court was particularly concerned with the "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting
in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights.",4' The Court observed that the manuals instructed the officers to
use isolation, trickery, and the "good cop/bad cop" routine while
conducting interrogations. By threatening the sanction of
and some police officers. Not one is shown by the record here to be the official
manual of any police department, much less in universal use in crime detection.
Moreover the examples of police brutality mentioned by the Court are rare
exceptions to the thousands of cases that appear every year in the law reports.
Id. at 499-500 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan also dissented. Id. at 504 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Harlan recounted the details of Miranda's crime and his
subsequent arrest, asserting that the confession "was accomplished in two hours or less
without any force, threats or promises." Id. at 518 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He continued:
Miranda's oral and written confessions are now held inadmissible under the
Court's new rules. One is entitled to feel astonished that the Constitution can be
read to produce this result. These confessions were obtained during brief,
daytime questioning conducted by two officers and unmarked by any of the
traditional indicia of coercion. They assured a conviction for a brutal and
unsettling crime, for which the police had and quite possibly could obtain little
evidence other than the victim's identifications, evidence which is frequently
unreliable. There was, in sum, a legitimate purpose, no perceptible unfairness,
and certainly little risk of injustice in the interrogation. Yet the resulting
confessions, and the responsible course of police practice they represent, are to
be sacrificed to the Court's own finespun conception of fairness which I seriously
doubt is shared by many thinking citizens in this country.
Id. at 518-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 445.
45. Id. at 449-55. The Court described the "Mutt and Jeff" act as follows:
"In this technique, two agents are employed. Mutt, the relentless investigator,
who knows the subject is guilty and is not going to waste any time. He's sent a
dozen men away for this crime and he's going to send the subject away for the
full term. Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously a kindhearted man. He has a
family himself. He has a brother who was involved in a little scrape like this. He
disapproves of Mutt and his tactics and will arrange to get him off the case if the
subject will cooperate. He can't hold Mutt off for very long. The subject would
be wise to make a quick decision. The technique is applied by having both
investigators present while Mutt acts out his role. Jeff may stand by quietly and
demur at some of Mutt's tactics. When Jeff makes his plea for cooperation, Mutt
is not present in the room."
Id. at 452 (quoting O'HARA, supra note 39, at 104). The Court provided another poignant
example of police trickery:
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the manuals instruct the
police to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward
appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming certain details. The guilt
of the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should direct his
comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than
court failure by asking the subject whether he did it. Like other men, perhaps
the subject has had a bad family life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to
drink, had an unrequited desire for women. The officers are instructed to
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inadmissibility of the incriminating statement if the officer did not read
the warnings, Miranda set out to secure constitutional rights for suspects
during a custodial interrogation.46
Miranda left open the possibility that Congress or the states may
devise their own innovative procedural safeguards. The Court
"encourage[d] Congress and the States to continue their laudable search
for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual
while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws."4 7 Within
two years of Miranda, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501.48 This
provision sought to replace the warnings laid out in Miranda with a
voluntariness test.49 Congress stated that as long as a suspect's statement
was deemed voluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances, it
could be admissible as evidence in a criminal proceeding."'
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of § 3501 in
Dickerson v. United States." In Dickerson, the Court held that because
Miranda laid out a constitutional rule, Congress could not overturn that
minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on
society. These tactics are designed to put the subject in the psychological state
where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know
already-that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and
discouraged.
Id. at 450.
46. But see GARCIA, supra note 34, at 120 n.3 (citing numerous articles with
conflicting reports as to the effect of Miranda warnings on the rate of confessions, and
concluding that "the true effect of Miranda on the confession rate is unknown and
unknowable").
47. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000) (held unconstitutional by Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000)).
49. See id.
50. Id. The statute states, in pertinent part:
In any criminal prosecution ... a confession.., shall be admissible in evidence if
it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to
voluntariness .... The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall
take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the
confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the
defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before
arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was
not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used
against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such
defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when
giving such confession.
Id.
51. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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case by enacting legislation that changed the standard from one of
obligatory warnings to a more vague voluntariness standard. The Court
recognized Congress's frustration with Miranda, stating, "The
disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no
means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his 'rights,' may
nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant [may] go free as a
result. 5 3 But, the Court expressed concern that "experience suggests
that the totality-of-the-circumstances test which § 3501 seeks to revive is
more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to,
and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.,14  Thus, the Court
confirmed that Miranda was binding law and determined that any
congressional rule seeking to change it either would have to align with
Miranda, or pass in the form of a constitutional amendment.55
52. Id. at 444. See generally Conor G. Bateman, Dickerson v. United States: Miranda
Is Deemed a Constitutional Rule, but Does It Really Matter?, 55 ARK L. REV. 177 (2002);
Richard H.W. Maloy, Can a Rule Be Prophylactic and yet Constitutional?, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 2465 (2001) (analyzing the Dickerson opinion and criticizing the
Court's method of constitutional review); Mitch Reid, Note, United States v. Dickerson:
Uncovering Miranda's Once Hidden and Esoteric Constitutionality, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1343
(2001).
53. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444; see, e.g., Cassell, supra note 35 (arguing that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 should replace Miranda); Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda,
112 YALE L.J. 447 (2002) (arguing that Miranda is merely an exclusionary rule that puts
no constitutional obligations on police conduct). But see Michael Avery, You Have a
Right to Remain Silent, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (2003) (arguing that suspects should
have an absolute right to remain silent).
54. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. Contra Jonathan B. Zeitlin, Voluntariness with a
Vengeance: Miranda and a Modern Alternative, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 109, 122 (2001).
The article summarizes the benefits of the legislation as follows:
If properly applied, § 3501 would allow the judge to use common sense when
considering whether a confession should be admitted or suppressed. The judge
would not be limited to a technical application of Miranda and instead, could
consider all the circumstances of a conversation. It is for this reason that § 3501
has been supported by so many in the field of law enforcement ....
Id. Zeitlin concludes the article lamenting "[t]hat the FBI failed to mirandize Dickerson
before questioning him is unfortunate; that such failure should result in Dickerson's
acquittal is deplorable. It is time for a better solution." Id. at 163 (footnote omitted).
55. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. Garcia discusses several motives for Congress'
attempt to repeal Miranda
through this legislative sleight of hand[.] Either it sought to declare the opinion
an unconstitutional piece of judicial rule making, as its critics have charged, or it
sought to set up a confrontation in which the Court would be faced with the
option of exercising the power of judicial review to revoke the portion of 3501
repealing Miranda. A third explanation is that Congress merely wanted to get on
the bandwagon of popular opinion by reaffirming a "tough on crime" stance.
Finally, Congress could have envisioned a changing political climate in which
appointments to the Supreme Court by a conservative, Republican president
would provide the new Court with the opportunity to ratify 3501 and overrule
Miranda.
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III. MIRANDA WARNINGS: IS THE FIFTH AMENDMENT VIOLATED
WHEN THE STATEMENT Is NEVER USED AGAINST THE SUSPECT?
A. Miranda Interpretations by the U.S. Circuit Courts
Traditionally, the circuit courts have been reluctant to uphold Fifth
Amendment claims when statements were not used against suspects at
16trial . The Seventh Circuit briefly addressed the Fifth Amendment's
application in these situations in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.57 In response
to petitioner Buckley's assertion that the police coercively interrogated
him without first giving him Miranda warnings, the court remarked,
"Interrogations without Miranda warnings... do not violate a suspect's
rights; the violation occurs only when the statements are used in criminal
proceedings.58  Likewise, in Davis v. City of Charleston,9 the Eighth
Circuit quickly dismissed Davis' civil rights claim for violation of
Miranda because the confession was not admitted at trial.60 In one
sentence, the court dismissed this alleged constitutional violation and
reinforced its position on the Fifth Amendment as a trial right, stating,
"[the officer's] failure to warn Davis of her rights pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, did not deprive her of
her constitutional rights as no statements obtained from Davis during
custodial interrogation were used against her during trial."6
In Cooper v. Dupnik,62 however, the Ninth Circuit opened the door to
the possibility of invoking the Fifth Amendment even when a non-
Mirandized statement was not used against the suspect at trial.63 After a
series of rapes occurred in the area over a two-year period, the sheriff's
department created a task force comprised of its most experienced
officers. 64 The task force devised an interrogation plan, under which they
would "ignore the suspect's constitutional right to remain silent as well as
GARCIA, supra note 34, at 99.
56. See Avery, supra note 53, at 601, 609-10 (discussing a circuit court decision as to
whether coercive statements raise a claim under § 1983).
57. 919 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1990), amended by Nos. 89-2441, 89-2899, 89-900, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 487 (7th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded by 502 U.S. 801 (1991), aff d
as modified, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded by 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
58. Id. at 1244.
59. 827 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded by 917 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1987).
60. Id. at 322.
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 1223.
64. ld. The court noted that "[m]embers of the Task Force planned meticulously for
the day they would arrest their first suspect." Id. at 1223-24. The person responsible for
the two-year criminal spree of rapes, robberies, and kidnappings was dubbed the "Prime
Time Rapist." Id. at 1223.
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any request he might make to speak with an attorney in connection
therewith, to hold the suspect incommunicado, and to pressure and
interrogate him until he confessed." 5 The police arrested Cooper and
66
used these tactics on him. Despite his anxiety, Cooper maintained his
innocence throughout the interrogation.67 Cooper's repeated requests
for counsel went unheeded."' Although his interrogator eventually
believed that Cooper was innocent, other officers continued to
interrogate him until late in the evening, when the interrogation finally
ended and Cooper was put in jail.69 Cooper never confessed and was
released twenty-four hours after his arrest.70
65. Id. at 1224. While the members of the task force knew that the suspect's
statement would be inadmissible due to the exclusionary rule of Miranda, they hoped that
such tactics would "deprive [the suspect] of the opportunity of forming an insanity
defense" and "prevent the defendant from testifying at his own trial." Id. at 1225. One of
the task force members, Detective Barkman, testified that
[flirst of all, traditionally, I have believed and have taught that when an attorney
or when someone asserts a right of silence or attorney, cease, scrupulously honor
their request, for several different reasons.
But there comes a time when in a major case having major criminal ramifications
on public safety you may make a conscious decision to continue the interrogation
failing to honor the request.
Id. at 1226.
66. Id. at 1229-31. Cooper was identified as a suspect based on a supposed
fingerprint match. Id. at 1228. In fact, the so-called match was identified by an
identification technician whose primary job was to process color photographs for the crime
lab. Id. This technician had taken Arizona's fingerprinting examination and had failed.
Id. Furthermore, he had not worked with fingerprint identification for the previous six to
nine years. Id. Not surprisingly, then, Cooper's fingerprints were later found not to match
the suspect's, and Cooper was released. Id. at 1234.
67. Id. at 1230-31. It is remarkable that Cooper did not confess, due to the coercive
atmosphere of the investigation. Id. at 1231. The interrogator told Cooper that he would
be indicted for rape and questioned him about details of his sex life, family life, and
religious background. Id. at 1229-31. The court stated that "the record contains evidence
indicating he was traumatized by this encounter and later suffered post-traumatic stress
syndrome. In the middle of the interrogation, even the hardened veteran Weaver
Barkman [(Cooper's interrogator)] was, in his own words, 'upset,' 'angry,' displaying 'a lot
of emotion,' and 'leak[ing] emotionally."' Id. at 1231 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
68. Id. at 1231. Cooper repeatedly stated, unequivocally, '"I want to talk to my
lawyer, Nancy Pastero.. . , as soon as possible, sir, and I will not give you any more of my
honesty because you're not buying it."' Id.
69. Id. at 1231-32. One of the members of the task force, shortly after Cooper was
arrested, announced to the press that "what we have caught is a man who has committed
two rapes of twenty we are looking at." Id. at 1234. The court noted that the officer
"made this statement knowing that (1) Cooper did not fit the physical description of the
rapist given by the victims of the two rapes in question, and (2) [the interrogator] believed
Cooper was not responsible for these incidents." Id.
70. Id. at 1232-33. It was not until two months later that the police department stated
to the media that Cooper was no longer a suspect. Id. at 1234. The court noted, "[In the
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The Ninth Circuit held that the officers' behavior violated both
Cooper's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right.7' As to the Fifth
Amendment claim, the Ninth Circuit found that although Cooper never
confessed, he did make statements which "could and probably would
have been used against him had he gone to trial., 72 The court reasoned
that there would be no cause of action for an inadvertent violation of
Miranda "without also trespassing on the actual Constitutional right
against self-incrimination that those safeguards are designed to
protect., 73  In this case, such a trespass occurred because the police
conduct was "'identical with the historical practices [of incommunicado
interrogation] at which the right against self-incrimination was aimed"'
and thus required constitutional protection. 74  As to the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right,75 the Ninth Circuit used the
1 - 76
"shock the conscience" test developed in Rochin v. California, finding
interim between his arrest and the announcement clearing him, Cooper alleges that he and
his family were evicted from their residence, that he was fired from his job, and that he
suffered serious injury to his business and personal reputation." Id.
71. Id. at 1237.
72. Id. at 1236. Cooper made statements that he hit his wife, and that he sometimes
roamed the streets alone at night for hours. Id. at 1237.
73. Id. at 1243-44.
74. Id. at 1244 (alternation in original) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444
(1974)).
75. The Fourteenth Amendment states the following: "No State shall.., deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
76. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, the police, acting on a tip that Rochin was selling
drugs, entered his home and found him in his bedroom. Id. at 166. Rochin, seeing the
police, swallowed two capsules. Id. The police handcuffed Rochin and brought him to the
hospital where they instructed the doctor to "force[] an emetic solution through a tube
into Rochin's stomach against his will." Id. Rochin subsequently vomited the capsules,
which contained morphine, and was convicted of possession primarily based on this
evidence. Id. Holding that the police officers violated Rochin's Fourteenth Amendment
right to substantive due process, the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe faculties of the Due
Process Clause may be indefinite and vague, but the mode of their ascertainment is not
self-willed." Id. at 172. The Court set out the test as follows:
In each case "due process of law" requires an evaluation based on a disinterested
inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and
fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, on a judgment
not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of
continuity and of change in a progressive society.
Id. (citation omitted). For an examination of how the Due Process Clause might apply in
the case of a suspected terrorist, see M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh:
Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319 (2003).
Darmer poses the question:
Would government action that "shocks the conscience" in a case involving illegal
drugs also "shock the conscience" in a case involving terrorism? What if, for
example, a suspected terrorist swallowed capsules containing small bits of paper
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that the police officers violated Cooper's Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process right through their planned and manipulative
behavior to compel Cooper's confession.77
B. Foreshadowing the Scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause
Prior to Chavez, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the FifthS 71
Amendment's reach in dicta in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. In
that case, the Mexican authorities brought a Mexican citizen, an alleged
drug smuggler, to the United States to be arrested.79 Officials from the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in cooperation with
Mexican authorities, searched the suspect's home in Mexico, and
uncovered documents regarding drug smuggling operations. The
suspect moved to suppress the recovered evidence on the ground that it
was illegally seized without a warrant and, therefore, violated the Fourth
Amendment.8"
The Supreme Court held that a search of foreign property owned by a
foreign citizen was outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment"' and
thus, did not constitute an illegal search.83 Most significantly-in
on which appeared code numbers required to deactivate a bomb? Would it
"shock the conscience," then, to pump his stomach?
Id. at 369. Darmer answers that this course of action would not violate due proccss under
these compelling circumstances, nor would it elicit a "false confession." Id. at 370.
77. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1248-49. The test outlaws police conduct that "offend[s]
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses." Id. The
court stated:
This case is an example of officials who deliberately choose to ignore the law and
the Constitution in favor of their own methods. For victims caught in their snare,
the Constitution of the United States becomes a useless piece of paper. When
law-enforcement officials act this way, they invite redress under § 1983.
Id. at 1252.
78. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
79. Id. at 262. The suspect was thought to be the leader of a violent drug trafficking
organization that worked along the United States/ Mexico border. Id.
80. Id. at 262-63. The agents were hoping to find evidence concerning the suspect's
involvement in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of a DEA special agent. Id. at 262.
81. Id. at 263. The district court granted the motion, holding that the warrantless
search was unjustified, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id.
82. Id. at 274-75. The Court stated that "The Fourth Amendment [as distinguished
from the Fifth Amendment] .. . prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures' whether or
not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial, and a violation of the Amendment
is 'fully accomplished' at the time of an unreasonable governmental intrusion." Id. at 264
(citations omitted). The Court distinguished the present question from the use of the
evidence at trial: "Whether evidence obtained from respondent's Mexican residences
should be excluded at trial in the United States is a remedial question separate from the
existence vel non of the constitutional violation." Id.
83. Id. at 275.
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analyzing the Fourth Amendment issue-the Court referenced in passing
the Fifth Amendment, stating that "[t]he privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial
right of criminal defendants." The Court's dicta foreshadowed how it
would interpret the scope of the Fifth Amendment, which became clear
in Chavezi
IV. THE PATH TO THE SUPREME COURT: CHAVEZ V. MARTINEZ
A. The Dispute
The Chavez case arose out of an altercation between Oliverio
Martinez and police officers, Maria Pena and Andrew Salinas, on
November 28, 1997.6 Martinez was riding his bicycle through a deserted
lot in a residential neighborhood when Salinas called for him to stop.
8 7
Martinez obeyed Salinas, who patted him down for weapons."" Salinas
found a knife on Martinez and tried to handcuff him; a struggle ensued,
the facts of which remained in dispute.8 9  Although the officers
84. Id. at 264. The Court clarified this statement further, stating that "[ajlthough
conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a
constitutional violation occurs only at trial." Id.
85. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003) (plurality opinion). Contra Susan R.
Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2003). The author argues:
[Some] suggest that dicta in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez intended to
reverse the long line of "penalty cases" prohibiting the government from
penalizing the invocation of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause in
any pretrial setting, even where there is no resulting statement to use in a
criminal trial .... [This] proposition[] [is] unsound.
Id. (footnote omitted). Michael Avery shares this opinion, stating:
For the sake of illustration, the Court [(in Verdugo-Urquidez)] contrasted the
Fourth Amendment with the Fifth Amendment, observing that in the case of
Fifth Amendment violations, a violation clearly occurs at trial if a coerced
statement is introduced in evidence. It should be noted, however, that the Court
had no occasion to consider, even for the purpose of the comparison it was
making, whether a Fifth Amendment violation can occur prior to trial.
Avery, supra note 53, at 594.
86. Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub norn.
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
87. Id.
88. Id. Both officers agreed that Martinez cooperated with them. Brief for
Respondent at 1, Chavez (No. 01-1444).
He obeyed their command and parked his bike, put the kickstand down, and
never spoke ill to Salinas, he just stood right by his bicycle. He obeyed when the
officer told him to place his hands behind his head. Salinas had no information
that Martinez was involved in criminal activity or under the influence of drugs.
Id. (citations omitted).
89. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854. Salinas testified that Martinez was trying to get away
from him; Martinez claimed that he did not resist. Id. The knife that Officer Salinas
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maintained that Martinez did not attempt to strike them, they claimed
that Martinez seized Salinas's gun.9 Salinas reacted by striking
Martinez.9' Martinez argued that he did not touch the gun itself, but
rather grabbed Salinas's hand to prevent him from reaching the gun.92
The parties agreed that Salinas cried out, "He's got my gun," prompting
Pena to fire at Martinez several times.93 Martinez was rendered blind
and paralyzed in both legs as a result of the shooting.94 The officers
95handcuffed Martinez and waited for paramedics to arrive.
Sergeant Ben Chavez, the patrol supervisor, arrived to ascertain what
happened.96 After discussing the incident with Salinas, he boarded the
ambulance carrying Martinez to hear Martinez's version of the events.97
In the trauma room of the hospital's emergency department, Chavez
began a taped forty-five minute interview with Martinez.98 During this
time, hospital staff ordered Chavez to leave the room several times.99
Throughout his conversation with Chavez, Martinez was in and out of
consciousness, was afraid that he was dying, and was clear in his desire
not to continue the interview. After the incident, Martinez filed a civil
rights action for violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and his Fourteenth Amendment due process right pursuant
found was Martinez's work knife, which he used to cut strawberries. Brief for Respondent
at 2, Chavez (No. 01-1444).
90. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854.
91. Id.
92. Id. Flores, the farm worker who the officers questioned prior to stopping
Martinez, witnessed the shooting and gave testimony supporting Martinez's claim that he
never touched the gun, much less grabbed it from Salinas's holster. Brief for the
Respondent at 3, Chavez (No. 01-1444).
93. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854.
94. Id. Five bullets struck Martinez. Id. One bullet hit an optical nerve in Martinez's
face, rendering him blind. Id. Another bullet hit one of his vertebrae, fracturing it such
that his legs were paralyzed. Id. Three additional bullets hit him around his knee joint.
d.
95. Id.
96. Id. Chavez was a sixteen year veteran of the police force. Brief for the
Respondent at 3, Chavez (No. 01-1444).
97. Oxnard, 270 F.3d at 854.
98. Id. Although the interview lasted forty-five minutes, the actual conversation
between Chavez and a barely conscious Martinez totaled only ten minutes. Id. at 854-55.
99. Id. at 854.
100. Id. at 855. The court went into greater detail: "By the district court's tally,
'[d]uring the questioning at the hospital, [Martinez] repeatedly begged for treatment; he
told [Sergeant Chavez] he believed he was dying eight times; complained that he was in
extreme pain on fourteen separate occasions; and twice said he did not want to talk any
more."' Id. (alterations in original). The court also noted that "Chavez stopped only
when medical personnel moved Martinez out of the emergency room to perform a C.A.T.
scan." Id.
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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,"0 even though his statements were never used
against him at trial.
102
B. The Lower Courts' Rulings
The District Court for the Central District of California denied
Chavez's request for qualified immunity and granted Martinez's motion
for summary judgment with regard to his claim that Chavez's coercive
questioning of him in the hospital violated his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.' 3 Chavez appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that
he was entitled to qualified immunity. °a
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held unanimously
that Chavez was not entitled to qualified immunity because Martinez
stated a prima facie case and Chavez should have known of the rights he
violated.1 0 5  The court held that Chavez's "coercive, custodial
interrogation" of an ailing, hospitalized Martinez violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.'O°  Because he proved a violation of his
constitutional rights, Martinez could go forward with his § 1983 lawsuit.07
The court provided several justifications for its holding.ln First, the
court considered Cooper, where it found a violation of the Fifth
Amendment despite the government's failure to prosecute the suspect.1°9
Next, the court extended Miranda's prevention of coercive police
interrogations beyond the courthouse walls." Last, while the court
101. Id. Martinez alleged three violations: a stop lacking probable cause, the use of
excessive force, and coercive interrogation while under medical care. Id.
102. Id. at 857.
103. Id. at 855.
104. Id. at 855-56.
105. Id, at 856, 859. The court explained that "[q]ualified immunity shields [police
officers] 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."' Id. at 855 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The court
elaborated, "Only conduct that an official could not reasonably have believed was legal
under settled law falls outside the protective sanctuary of qualified immunity." Id.
106. Id. at 856.
107. Id. at 856-57.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1236-37, 1242-44 (9th Cir. 1992)).
The court reiterated that the "Fifth Amendment's purpose is to prevent coercive
interrogation practices that are 'destructive of human dignity."' Id. at 857 (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966)).
110. Id. Regarding its decision in Cooper, the court stated:
We echoed the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda that this animating purpose
was adequately achieved only if the Fifth Amendment cast its protection against
coerced self-incrimination not just over the courthouse, but also over the
jailhouse, the police station, and other settings in which law enforcement
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recognized that dicta in the Supreme Court's Verdugo-Urquidez decision
suggested the Fifth Amendment was specifically a trial right, the court
noted that Supreme Court dicta is not binding, stating that "where the
two are at odds . we are bound to follow our own binding
precedent." 11
As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court held that a
statement obtained through coercive interrogation violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of subsequent use against the
suspect at trial."2 The only support the court cited for this holding was
Cooper, which held that the actual use of a coerced statement in a
criminal proceeding was not essential for a constitutional violation to113
occur. Chavez appealed the court's decision again, this time to the
Supreme Court."
4
In Chavez, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment and held that
Chavez's interrogation of Martinez-absent subsequent use of the
statements from the interrogation against Martinez in a criminal
proceeding-did not infringe upon Martinez's right against self-
incrimination.' The Court did not decide the Fourteenth Amendment
issue, but remanded it for further consideration by the lower courts.'
16
V. THE PLURALITY DECISIONS IN CHAVEZ V. MARTINEZ
A. The Decision of the Court
The Chavez opinion was rendered in two parts." 7 Justice Thomas
wrote a plurality opinion on the Fifth Amendment issue; he was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia."8 Justice
Souter wrote the second part, addressing the issue of Fourteenth
authority was invoked to curtain a criminal suspect's freedom of action in any
significant way.
Id. at 857.
111. Id. n.3.
112. Id. at 857.
113. Id. ("The due process violation caused by coercive behavior of law-enforcement
officers in pursuit of a confession is complete with the coercive behavior itself .... The
actual use or attempted use of that coerced statement in a court of law is not necessary to
complete the affront to the Constitution." (ellipsis in original) (quoting Cooper, 963 F.2d at
1244-45)).
114. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,763 (2003).
115. Id, (plurality opinion).
116. Id. at 776 (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at762.
118. Id.
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Amendment protection, joined by Justices Breyer, Stevens, Kennedy,
and Ginsburg.119
The Fifth Amendment states: "No person.., shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."'1 20 Martinez argued that a
"criminal case" should be broadened to include police interrogations;
Justice Thomas disagreed, noting that a "'criminal case' at the very least
requires the initiation of legal proceedings.'. 21 Due to the absence of any
criminal proceedings against Martinez, Justice Thomas held that "[tihe
text of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply cannot support the Ninth
Circuit's view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without
more, violates the Constitution.',
12
Justice Thomas also found support in case law indicating that the
Ninth Circuit's decision was improper. Established precedent indicates
that the government may compel incriminating testimony of witnesses so
long as their testimony is never used against them in a criminal case.124
Thus, Justice Thomas concluded that merely obtaining a coerced
statement is not enough to raise a Fifth Amendment claim when, as in
Chavez, the witness is never compelled to testify against himself in a
criminal proceeding.
25
Justice Thomas also considered whether a violation of Miranda could
lead to a de facto violation of the Fifth Amendment without the witness
actually incriminating himself.' 26 He noted that although Miranda set
forth a rule intended to protect the rights found in the Self-Incrimination
Clause, it did not extend the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause
itself. 27 Thus, Justice Thomas found that "[t]he Ninth Circuit's view that
119. Id. One commentator noted, "This is one of those unfortunate cases in which
higher mathematics is necessary to figurc out the number of votes for particular issues."
Martin A. Schwartz, Challenging Coercive Police Interrogations Under § 1983, N.Y. L.J.,
July 29, 2003, at 3. Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's
opinion on the Fourteenth Amendment issue "[t]o assure a controlling judgment of the
Court." Chavez, 538 U.S. at 802 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
121. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766 (plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 767 (plurality opinion).
123. Id. at 767-69 (plurality opinion).
124. Id. at 767-68 (plurality opinion); see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427
(1984) (stating that an individual may choose to waive this privilege, even though his
statements may incriminate him); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1972)
(holding that use and derivative use immunity is sufficient to compel testimony in light of
a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege).
125. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 769 (plurality opinion).
126. Id. at 772-73 (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 770, 772 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas explained that "[riules
designed to safeguard a constitutional right . . . do not extend the scope of the
(Vol. 54:373
2004] Do You Really Have a Right to Silence?
mere compulsion violates the Self-Incrimination Clause finds no support
in the text of the Fifth Amendment or [the Supreme Court's] case law.,
128
Therefore, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision with respect to
the Fifth Amendment claim.
21
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court regarding Martinez's
Fourteenth Amendment claim that Officer Chavez violated his due
process rights through coercive interrogation."" The Court remanded the
issue of whether Martinez had a substantive due process claim to the
Ninth Circuit, leaving it to that court to determine whether the facts
established a Fourteenth Amendment claim.'3'
B. Justice Souter's Concurrence
Justice Souter also authored a concurring opinion. ' 32 In this opinion,
he suggested that the decision not to expand the scope of the Fifth
Amendment in this case, while sound, required a more thorough
analysis.3 3 Justice Souter reminded the Court that the scope of the Fifth
Amendment could be expanded, and a new judicial rule created, if itS 134
were found necessary to ensure core Fifth Amendment protections.
Thus, it is not inconceivable that the Fifth Amendment could be
extended beyond its current bounds and be made applicable in cases like
Chavez if the Court found that civil liability protection was necessary to
curb coerced confessions.135 Still, Justice Souter did not believe that
constitutional right itself, just as violations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not
violate the constitutional rights of any person." Id. at 772 (plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 773 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). Justice Thomas asserted that the
text of the Fifth Amendment did not condone "torture or other abuse" by police
authorities. Id. (plurality opinion). The Court's decision merely meant that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and not the Fifth Amendment was the
proper vehicle for redress. Id. (plurality opinion).
129. Id. at 773 (plurality opinion).
130. Id. at 779-80.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("To recognize such a constitutional
cause of action for compensation would, of course, be well outside the core of Fifth
Amendment protection, but that alone is not a sufficient reason to reject Martinez's
claim.").
134. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (.'[E]xtension[s]' of the bare
guarantee may be warranted, if clearly shown to be desirable means to protect the basic
right against the invasive pressures of contemporary society." (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
135. Id. at 777-78 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter then listed
several Fifth Amendment holdings that, while outside the core guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment, are necessary to preserve the essence of the protection behind the Fifth
Amendment. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). For example, Kastigar involved
the requirement of immunity against prosecution before a witness is compelled to testify
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Martinez could make a persuasive argument that an expanded Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination, allowing for civil
liability protection, was necessary to aid "the core guarantee [of the Fifth
Amendment]. 1 36 Such an expansion of the Fifth Amendment, argued
Justice Souter, could result in every interrogation being challenged under
this rule. 37 The lack of a limiting principle could result in liability for
every interrogation the police undertake. 13  In balancing the costs of
expanding the Fifth Amendment's protection, Justice Souter noted that
Martinez gave no argument that the Fifth Amendment guarantee had
been rendered ineffective, requiring an expanded Fifth Amendment
protection to include civil liability.139 Thus, Justice Souter concluded that
with incriminating evidence. Id. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1972)). The purpose of immunity statutes
is to remove the danger of self-incrimination and ensure that the essential protection of
the Fifth Amendment remains by guaranteeing that a person who gives incriminating
testimony will not be prosecuted as a result of that testimony. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at
444-46. The issue before the Kastigar Court was whether the immunity grant was
"coextensive with the scope of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege." Id. at 449. The Court
found that it was. Id. at 453. Immunity statutes, the Court said:
[Sleek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and
the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify. The
existence of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony and the fact that
many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving
useful testimony are those implicated in the crime .... [S]uch statutes have
"become part of our constitutional fabric."
Id. at 446-47 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)). Other holdings
reflecting extensions of the Fifth Amendment include: limiting compulsion to testify at
criminal proceedings, barring penalties for exercising Fifth Amendment rights, and
requiring Miranda warnings. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice
Souter elaborated, "All of this law is outside the Fifth Amendment's core, with each case
expressing a judgment that the core guarantee, or the judicial capacity to protect it, would
be placed at some risk in the absence of such complementary protection." Id. (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
136. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 778 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I do not ...
believe that Martinez can make the 'powerful showing,' subject to a realistic assessment of
costs and risks, necessary to expand protection of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination to the point of civil liability as he asks us to recognize here." (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 515 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
137. Id. at 778-79 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
138. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter explained:
If obtaining Martinez's statement is to be treated as a stand-alone violation of
the privilege subject to compensation, why should the same not be true whenever
the police obtain any involuntary self-incriminating statement, or whenever the
government so much as threatens a penalty in derogation of the right to
immunity, or whenever the police fail to honor Miranda? Martinez offers no
limiting principle or reason to foresee a stopping place short of liability in all
such cases.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
139. Id. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
Do You Really Have a Right to Silence?
the only remedy available to Martinez was a Fourteenth Amendment
claim, an issue reserved for remand.' 40
C. Justice Kennedy's Dissent and Concurrence
Justice Kennedy's dissent took strong issue with the views of Justices
Souter and Thomas." Justice Kennedy asserted that "[a] future privilege
does not negate a present right."14 2 He argued that the Fifth Amendment
privilege, in addition to protecting suspects from self-incrimination, also
provided "a continuing right against government conduct intended to
bring about self-incrimination," regardless of whether there is a
subsequent criminal proceeding.1 43  As such, Martinez's lack of
participation in a criminal proceeding would not exclude him from Fifth
Amendment protection.'"
140. Id. at 779-80 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
[I]f there is no failure of efficacy infecting the existing body of Fifth Amendment
law, any argument for a damages remedy in this case must depend not on its
Fifth Amendment feature but upon the particular charge of outrageous conduct
by the police, extending from their initial encounter with Martinez through the
questioning by Chavez. That claim, however, if it is to be recognized as a
constitutional one that may be raised in an action under § 1983, must sound in
substantive due process. Here, it is enough to say that Justice Stevens shows that
Martinez has a serious argument in support of such a position.
Id. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Souter and Justice Thomas are wrong, in my view, to maintain that in all
instances a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply does not occur
unless and until a statement is introduced at trial, no matter how severe the pain
or how direct and commanding the official compulsion used to extract it.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Our cases and our legal tradition establish that the Self-Incrimination Clause is a
substantive constraint on the conduct of the government, not merely an
evidentiary rule governing the work of the courts. The Clause must provide
more than mere assurance that a compelled statement will not be introduced
against its declarant in a criminal trial. Otherwise there will be too little
protection against the compulsion the Clause prohibits. The Clause protects an
individual from being forced to give answers demanded by an official in any
context when the answers might give rise to criminal liability in the future.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. See id. at 793-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Kennedy elaborated on his disagreement with the Court's decision, and his belief that the
Fifth Amendment guarantees a present right against coerced confessions, stating:
To tell our whole legal system that when conducting a criminal investigation
police officials can use severe compulsion or even torture with no present
violation of the right against compelled self-incrimination can only diminish a
celebrated provision in the Bill of Rights. A Constitution survives over time
because the people share a common, historic commitment to certain simple but
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Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment, and joining in Justice Souter's
concurrence, Justice Kennedy believed that a police officer violates an
individual's fundamental right to liberty when he extracts a confession
using torture or its equivalent.145 In this case, the record demonstrated
that Chavez used Martinez's vulnerable position to secure a statement
• 146
from him. The interrogator permitted Martinez to believe that he
would not get further medical treatment without responding to Chavez's
questions. 4 7  This action violated the Fourteenth Amendment;
consequently, Justice Kennedy would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
• • 148
opinion. However, he concurred with Justice Souter's opinion so that
the Court would have a controlling judgment and because he believed
that the Fourteenth Amendment would supply a claim for Martinez on
remand.
149
VI. THE RIGHT To REMAIN SILENT: DOES IT EXIST IN ISOLATION?
The differing opinions in Chavez, including the Fifth Amendment
plurality decision and the slim majority on the Fourteenth Amendment
issue, call into question whether the Supreme Court resolved this
dilemma or caused further confusion in this area."" The Court in Chavez
built on its dicta in Verdugo-Urquidez, limiting the Fifth Amendment to
the words of its text and use only when an individual incriminates himself
in court, thus eliminating this basis for relief in a civil rights action. The
question then remains: what protection is available for the un-
Mirandized suspect who is not charged with a crime? The answer lies in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Several justices suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment sufficiently
addresses situations like in Chavez.15' However, the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only when "evidence [is] obtained by methods that
are 'so brutal and so offensive to human dignity' that they 'shock the
fundamental principles which preserve their freedom. Today's decision
undermines one of those respected precepts.
Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 797-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. Id. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
District Court found that Martinez['s] ... blinding facial wounds made it impossible for
him visually to distinguish the interrogating officer from the attending medical personnel.
The officer made no effort to dispel the perception that medical treatment was being
withheld until Martinez answered the questions put to him." (citation omitted)).
148. Id. at 798-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. Id. at 799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. There would have been no majority as to the Fourteenth Amendment issue if
Justice Kennedy had not reluctantly joined Justice Souter's opinion. See id.
151. E.g., id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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conscience' [and] violate the Due Process Clause." '52  Given this high
standard required to "shock the conscience" of the Court, and the fact
that even within the Chavez case there were differing opinions as to
whether Chavez's actions met this standard, is it necessary to find a
middle ground to protect suspects who never go to trial and whose
interrogation does not "shock?'
5 3
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, indicated that the Fourteenth
Amendment might protect suspects like Martinez. He referenced cases
wherein the Court found that unusually coercive police interrogations
152. Id. at 774 (plurality opinion) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174
(1952)).
153. See id. at 774, 776-77 (plurality opinion), 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Thomas found that Chavez's interrogation of Martinez did not
"shock the conscience," stating that
[w]e ... must take into account the fact that Martinez was hospitalized and in
severe pain during the interview, but also that Martinez was a critical nonpolice
witness to an altercation resulting in a shooting by a police officer, and that the
situation was urgent given the perceived risk that Martinez might die and crucial
evidence might be lost. In these circumstances, we can find no basis in our prior
jurisprudence, or in our Nation's history and traditions to suppose that freedom
from unwanted police questioning is a right so fundamental that it cannot be
abridged absent a "compelling state interest."
Id. at 776 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). Justices Kennedy, Stevens and Ginsburg,
however, found that it did. Id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Viewing the facts from another angle, Justice Kennedy stressed the following:
[Martinez's] blinding facial wounds made it impossible for him visually to
distinguish the interrogating officer from the attending medical personnel. The
officer made no effort to dispel the perception that medical treatment was being
withheld until Martinez answered the questions put to him. There was no
attempt through Miranda warnings or other assurances to advise the suspect that
his cooperation should be voluntary. Martinez begged the officer to desist and
provide treatment for his wounds, but the questioning persisted despite these
pleas and despite Martinez's unequivocal refusal to answer questions.
Id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Avery, supra
note 53, at 575-76. Avery argues that such a middle ground is needed. Id. He argues that
there is actually no "right to remain silent," despite the popular Miranda warning, unless
the suspect interrogated eventually goes to trial. Id. at 575. He argues a need for a
concrete "right to remain silent," regardless of whether the statement is used at trial. Id.
at 576. Avery argues that coercive police interrogation alone
causes a constitutional violation that should be actionable pursuant to § 1983 ....
This right is not merely a "trial right" that may be invoked only during criminal
proceedings. Nor is the right limited to extreme cases where police abuse shocks
the conscience. Recognition that there is a cause of action under § 1983 for
damages caused by violations of this right is crucially important for deterrence of
police misconduct.
Id. at 575 (footnote omitted). This right, he believes, should be found in a § 1983 remedy
for coercive interrogation practices. Id. at 575-76.
154. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 783-84, 787 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Thus, his opinion indicated that
the high standard of the Fourteenth Amendment is attainable, and
perhaps sufficient to resolve claims such as Martinez's.
15 6
Justice Kennedy also saw the Fourteenth Amendment as an
appropriate avenue of relief. He preferred to apply the Fifth
Amendment to the Chavez case, but conceded that the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive due process rights provided an equally
effective way to achieve the same result. 117 Justice Kennedy focused on
the central issues of balancing the legitimate need for the police to collect
evidence in their investigation of a crime and the liberty right of the
• . .. 158
person undergoing interrogation. Justice Kennedy noted that "[t]here
is no rule against interrogating suspects who are in anguish and pain,"
citing examples of exigent circumstances which justified such action,
including the need to gather information regarding a kidnapping victim
or a dangerous criminal.'59 The police cannot, however, "prolong or
155. Id. at 787 (Stcvens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Examples
include a suspect denied counsel and interrogated for forty-eight hours, Darwin v.
Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 347 (1968), an officer with a rifle who threatened to kill the
suspect if he did not talk, Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36 (1967), a suspect
interrogated for nine days without food or sleep who confessed but later retracted his
statement, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709-10 (1967), and a mentally retarded youth
interrogated for a week during which time he fell ill and was taken to the hospital twice,
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 439 & n.3 (1961).
156. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 783-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, he dissented for the reason Justice Kennedy outlined, that the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause applies regardless of whether the suspect is tried in
a court. Id. at 789-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
generally Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (excluding a hospital interrogation much
like the one in Chavez at trial on the grounds that it was not voluntary).
157. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 795-96, 799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[A] ruling on substantive due process in this case could provide much of the
essential protection the Self-Incrimination Clause secures ....").
158. !d. at 796-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, Justice
Scalia, in oral arguments, suggested that coercion might be necessary to prevent a terrorist
attack. Steve Lash, Court Weighs Critically Ill Suspect's Rights, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Dec. 5, 2002, WESTLAW, 12/5/02 CHIDLB 2. The exchange between Justice Scalia and
Martinez's attorney, R. Samuel Paz, proceeded as follows:
"What if you have a person [who] wants to blow up the World Trade Center?"
Scalia asked. "When is necessity an excuse to violate the Fifth Amendment?"
Paz responded that saving the life of a child or hundreds of people in a
skyscraper would justify police coercion so long as it remains reasonable under
the circumstances.
"When there is immediate danger, there is no constitutional violation," said the
Los Angeles attorney. "This is not a terrorist case."
Martinez, blind, paralyzed and near death, presented no imminent threat, Paz
said.
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increase a suspect's suffering against the suspect's will."' 6  If such
intentional suffering could be demonstrated, with the intent of eliciting
an incriminating statement, then according to Justice Kennedy, § 1983
remedies should be available. 161
The Fourteenth Amendment due process approach provides sufficient
protection and is its own middle ground between allowing a Fifth
Amendment claim as Justice Kennedy would favor,' 62 and not allowing
any claim as Justice Thomas proposes. 163  Although the Amendment
stops short of guaranteeing a stand-alone right to remain silent, divorced
from the context of subsequent criminal proceedings, it does allow a
claim for truly objectionable police practices.' This analysis maintains
the balance between the need for police to carry out necessary
investigative interrogations and the requirement that they use
appropriate methods to do so.'65
160. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy noted that "[tihe transcript of the interrogation ... and other evidence
considered by the District Court demonstrate that the suspect thought his treatment would
be delayed, and thus his pain and condition worsened, by refusal to answer questions." Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 766 (plurality opinion).
164. See id. at 774 (plurality opinion).
165. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, elaborated on what might constitute a
necessary interrogation:
There is no rule against interrogating suspects who are in anguish and pain. The
police may have legitimate reasons, borne of exigency, to question a person who
is suffering or in distress. Locating the victim of a kidnapping, ascertaining the
whereabouts of a dangerous assailant or accomplice, or determining whether
there is a rogue police officer at large are some examples.
Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, many
commentators remain concerned with the apparent lack of a true right to remain silent.
E.g., Avery, supra note 53, at 584. Michael Avery, writing prior to the Chavez decision
and arguing that recognizing a right to remain silent was crucial to deterring police
misconduct, commented:
A more appropriate warning by police officers, were the Supreme Court to
conclude that the right to remain silent did not exist prior to trial, would be
something like:
There is a risk that anything you say to us might be introduced into evidence at
trial. At that time you will have an opportunity to try to convince a judge that
any statements you made to us were involuntary. But regardless of what
happens at trial, you don't have a right not to answer our questions. As long as
we have a sufficient governmental interest in compelling an involuntary
statement from you, we can make you talk, unless we do anything that is so
brutal and degrading that it is shocking to the conscience.
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VII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION ON REMAND
The Ninth Circuit, on remand from the Chavez decision, had the
opportunity to rule on whether Martinez had stated a claim for a
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation.166 The court, reviewing
the facts of the case, stated that "it would be impossible not to be
shocked by Sergeant Chavez's actions.",16' The court held that "[a]
clearly established right, fundamental to ordered liberty, is freedom from
coercive police interrogation."1 68  Thus, if Martinez's allegations are
proven on remand to the district court, then Chavez violated Martinez's
Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from coercive police• . . 169
interrogation, and Martinez would be able to pursue damages under §
1983.170
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the Court in Chavez eliminated the Fifth Amendment as an
avenue to pursue damages for a constitutional violation under § 1983, it
opened the door for allowing a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment's "shocking the conscience ,7 or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" ' tests. The Ninth Circuit, on remand, seized the
opportunity by making freedom from the coercive police tactics used on
Martinez a fundamental right, thus giving rise to a cause of action for
damages under § 1983. 17
The Supreme Court's decision in Chavez, while clouded in diverging
opinions, succeeded in maintaining a balance between the needs of the
police in investigating crimes, and the rights of individuals to avoid
unduly coercive interrogations by the police. While the Court refused to
find the answer in the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
166. Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
167. Id. The Court recounted the "shocking" aspects of the case:
Martinez alleges that Chavez brutally and incessantly questioned him, after he
had been shot in the face, back, and leg and would go on to suffer blindness and
partial paralysis, and interfered with his medical treatment while he was
"screaming in pain.., and going in and out of consciousness." Chavez allegedly
continued this "interrogation" over Martinez's pleas for him to stop so that he
could receive treatment."
Id. (omission in original).
168. Id.
169. Id. ("The ultimate resolution of the merits of Martinez's Fourteenth Amendment
claim will depend upon the resolution of contested facts. We leave that resolution to the
district court.").
170. See supra note 7.
171. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 774 (plurality opinion).
172. See id. at 775 (plurality opinion).
173. Oxnard, 337 F.3d at 1092.
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incrimination, even the Fifth Amendment advocates on the Bench joined
with the majority to designate the Fourteenth Amendment as an
available avenue of relief. By rejecting the Fifth Amendment argument
and embracing that of the Fourteenth, the Court created a situation
where although there is not an absolute "right to remain silent," a person
will be protected against unnecessary and excessive police interrogation.
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